Remote Server Login
RDP · SSH · Jump hosts
Read moreStep-up authentication in front of remote access, working with OpenVPN and standard firewall VPNs over RADIUS — so remote access hardens without a network redesign.
A VPN concentrator that accepts a username and password is a single credential away from handing an attacker a route into your network. Remote access is the most commonly abused entry point precisely because it is designed to be reachable from the internet.
The usual objection is disruption. VPN is business-critical, the user population is large and distributed, and a failed rollout is immediately visible to everybody. That argues for an approach that layers onto the concentrator you already run rather than replacing it.
| Before | After |
|---|---|
| One leaked VPN credential is a route into the network. | The credential is useless without an out-of-band approval. |
| Remote access is the same for everyone, everywhere. | Geo-fencing and risk scoring apply different rules to different contexts. |
| A suspicious login is noticed days later. | The user can lock their own account the moment an unexpected prompt arrives. |
The VPN concentrator is configured to authenticate against the platform over RADIUS — a change measured in minutes, not a migration.
A small group is enrolled and moved onto MFA first, with the existing path still available behind it.
Remaining users self-enrol through the QR portal, in waves you control.
Once coverage is proven, the password-only path is closed and policy takes over.
If yours is not here, our team will answer it directly.
Ask usBring the system you are worried about and we will show you exactly how this control would be applied to it.